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The purposes of this paper include (a) a review of the literature on the so-called 
￿African dummy;￿ (b) an explication of the system GMM method of estimation, by which 
Hoeffler (2002) shows the ￿Africa dummy￿ to be an artifact of the application of 
inappropriate estimation techniques; and (c) an effort to employ this technique to measure 
the impact of political variables ￿ measures of stability, regime type, and violence ￿ on 
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This paper revisits the empirical growth literature, with the main objective of highlighting the 
crucial importance of politics in explaining the growth process in Africa. It is part of a bigger 
comparative project on ￿Explaining Growth in Africa￿ directed by the African Economic 
Research Consortium (AERC). In consistency with the rest of the project, the paper adopts 
the System Generalized Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) as the preferred estimation 
procedure. This is in line with Hoeffler (2002), one of the benchmark papers used in the 
project. The paper aims to estimate an ￿augmented￿ Solow model of growth, adding political 
variables to the standard economic variables of the Solow model.  
Following Ndulu and O￿Connell (2000), whether the addition of political variables 
improves the explanatory power of the Solow model is determined based on the comparison 
of the fits and residuals of the two models. In addition to econometric reasons, the choice of 
the sample and the estimation procedure are guided by the need to produce results that are 
comparable with the fits and residuals computed on the basis of Hoeffler (2002).   
In the second section, the paper discusses briefly the theoretical and empirical 
literature on growth with a special focus on results relating to African economies. A brief 
background to the AERC project is also presented. From its preliminary results, the project 
has highlighted the crucial importance of politics in explaining economic growth. This is the 
subject of section 3. In section 4, a brief discussion of the System Generalised Method of 
Moments (SYS-GMM) is provided. Section 5 presents Hoeffler (2002) empirical model used 
as our benchmark. Section 6 discusses empirical results of the SYS-GMM model of growth 






In his seminal work on growth, Solow (1956) developed the idea that economic growth is an 
outcome of capital accumulation. Countries that experience per capita growth have 
increasing capital-labour ratios, which in turn result from high enough rates of savings 
(capital accumulation) to compensate for the cost of capital depreciation and population 
growth. The concept of capital was later broadened to include human capital (Lucas, 1988; 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). Based on the hypothesis of diminishing returns to capital, the 
Solow growth model predicted that growth in per capita income eventually ends in the long-
run. This was in contradiction with empirical data on a number of countries that displayed 
positive growth rates for more than a century. 
Given that long-term growth in the Solow growth model is determined by an 
exogenous rate of technological progress, the contradiction was later explained as being due 
to the absence of an endogenous process of technological innovation in the model. The 
theoretical foundations of technological change and its impact on growth were laid by Arrow 
(1962) and Sheshinski (1967). However, it is only in the late 1980s that Romer (1986; 1987) 
and Lucas (1988) developed a framework where sustained research and development (R&D) 
in a context of imperfect competition may lead to positive per capita GDP growth in the 
long-term. Determination of long-run growth within the growth model led to the so-called 
￿endogenous growth model￿. It is in this context that Solow￿s model is sometimes referred to 
as an ￿exogenous growth model￿, while the Romer and Lucas model is termed an 
￿endogenous growth model￿.  
Following these theoretical developments, most recent research on growth has been 
empirical. Generally, empirical results based on the Solow growth model are estimates of an 





1 (i) a measure of the initial level of output and the initial level of technology to 
capture the impact of initial conditions; (ii) the [exogenous] rate of technological change to 
account for productivity changes; (iii) the savings rate to capture capital accumulation; (iv) 
the growth rate of the work force; (v) the rate of depreciation of capital; (vi) the share of 
capital in output; and, (vii) the rate of convergence to the steady-state (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995). This specification is directly derived from a production function. 
A number of empirical studies have found that the Solow growth model fails to 
explain Africa￿s economic growth. An ￿African dummy￿ has been found to be large and 
significant in cross-section studies, suggesting that Africa￿s growth responds to variables 
different from those explaining it elsewhere (Barro and Lee, 1993; Easterly and Levine, 
1997). Other studies, as noted by Collier and Gunning (1999, p. 65), eliminated the dummy 
￿though to an extent by transferring the puzzle elsewhere￿. This is the case with Sachs and 
Warner (1997) for example, who do not find a significant African dummy but instead find a 
significant ￿tropics dummy￿. 
Both specification and estimation techniques could explain the significance of the 
African dummy. Most researchers have responded to the puzzle of the Africa dummy by re-
specifying the growth model and adding variables thought to capture missing factors not 
explained by the textbook Solow model. First, some studies endogenize the savings variable 
by including in the model the policy variables influencing savings. These include the black 
market premium, the rate of inflation and the rate of the budget deficit.
2 Even sociological 
variables such as ethnic fractionalisation have been considered important in explaining the 
Africa￿s dummy (see Easterly and Levine, 1997). Sachs and Warner (1997) added 
geographical variables to the list and found a significant tropical dummy. More generally, 
                                                 




some studies have also introduced political variables in growth models to explain better the 
growth process (see for instance Barro and Lee, 1993; Alesina et al., 1996; and Easterly and 
Levine, 1997). 
Anke Hoeffler (2002) is among the few who responded to the debate over the 
African dummy from an econometric perspective. In her methodologically detailed study, 
Hoeffler found that the significance of the African dummy was due to estimation problems. 
All the studies cited above used either cross section OLS or fixed effect panel approaches to 
estimate the growth model. However, it is simple to show that these methods are flawed 
when estimating dynamic panel data models (see the discussion below).  Hoeffler presents 
five models using five different estimation techniques.  She finds that when the appropriate 
method of estimation is used, the African dummy is no more significant even when the 
model is restricted to the basic Solow model without adding any more variables.  She 
therefore concludes that growth in Africa is explained by the same fundamental production 
function factors used in the Solow model. 
Underlying the controversy is the complexity of the growth process. Most studies 
claiming to have explained growth account for just a small proportion of the variation in the 
rate of growth. This cannot be otherwise because growth has its country or regional 
idiosyncratic determinants. Whether these are so important that they invalidate the main 
pattern given by the basic variables of the Solow model is an empirical question. An 
important but rarely adopted approach to explaining growth, probably due to its high cost, 
remains the ￿case study￿ approach. It is only through case study analysis that the predictions 
of cross-country models can be confronted with country ￿realities￿ to determine their 
robustness.  
                                                                                                                                                 




The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) has launched a project on 
case studies of economic growth in Africa. About 30 countries are being studied by African 
scholars, under general coordination by economists and political economists. The central 
objective of the project is to produce what has been termed a ￿re-writing of African 
economic history by Africans￿. The plan is to have a collection of the project results 
published by Cambridge University Press in edited volumes under the general title 
￿Cambridge Economic Survey of Africa￿. 
This project is unique in many respects. First, it is an initiative of an African 
institution using highly qualified Africans to write about Africa. Secondly, the richness of its 
methodology matches the challenge posed by the complexity of the growth process. The 
analysis of growth blends macroeconomic accounting, political economy, microeconomic 
and institutional analyses. Thirdly, the project￿s relatively wide coverage￿about 30 
countries-- implies that the project will propose a growth profile that is truly African. In the 
process, researchers can address and perhaps resolve the question whether Africa￿s growth is 
explained by the factors generally included in the cross-country literature.  
 
3. Political Factors and Economic Growth 
The role of political variables in explaining economic growth has been acknowledged by 
many economists. For instance, Barro and Lee (1993) used the number of revolutions while 
Easterly and Levine (1997) used the number of assassinations to proxy for social disturbance 
as a determinant of growth. Alesina and Perotti (1996a) used a set of variables, namely the 
number of assassinations, deaths, coups and demonstrations to compute an index of political 
instability using the principal component method. Moreover, Alesina et al. (1996b) used 




power, to proxy for political instability. They also included a dummy variable representing 
democratic institutions. Fosu (2001) based his measure of political instability on three 
variants of ￿coup plots￿, namely successful, abortive and officially reported coups. Collier and 
Gunning (1999) used the number of months of war in a country to proxy for social 
disturbance.  
Barro and Lee, Alesina and Perotti and Alesina et al. found negative and statistically 
significant coefficients, deducing that social disturbance or political instability has a 
significant negative impact on economic growth. The coefficients in Easterly and Levine, 
and Collier and Gunning are negative but not statistically significant. Fosu￿s coefficient on 
the instability variable is positive; he justifies the sign as meaning that a coup may signal a 
positive development if a government change is seen as necessary to help revitalize an 
economy. Although some coups may be perceived as welcome events when they depose 
dictators albeit through illegal means, it is hard to generalize that coups always bring good 
news for growth, especially when they target democratically elected governments. The 
positive relationship between political instability and growth in Fosu (2001) is probably due 
to the nature of the sample which is made of only 31 Sub-Saharan African countries. In a 
global sample, we should expect political instability to be negatively related to growth given 
the destructions and uncertainty it entails. 
The conclusion that political instability has no impact on growth remains strikingly 
counter-intuitive as is the result that the relationship is positive. The result may be dependent 
on the quality of the proxies used to measure social disturbance. For instance, the use of the 
number of months of civil war focuses on the most extreme case of social disturbance which 
is, on average, a rather rare event, implying that there is not much variation in the variable. 




many as 85 percent of the countries never experienced civil war. As a result, only 15 percent 
of the countries have nonzero values of the months of civil war for the sample which covers 
the period from 1960 to 1990. As we show in the next section, the methods of estimation 
may also contribute to biased estimates, affecting the conclusions drawn on the basis of such 
parameters. 
In his chapter 7 on ￿Social Infrastructure and Long-Run Economic Performance￿ 
Jones (2002) discusses some of the reasons why politics matters for economic growth. The 
underlying argument is that growth results from investment and out of three factors 
determining the expected profitability of investment, two are related to political institutions. 
These are: (i) the extent to which the economy favours production instead of diversion, and 
(ii) the stability of the economic environment (p. 140). Diversion of resources is a 
consequence of practices such as corruption, theft, the payment of protection money, 
confiscatory taxation, the lobbying of government by special interests, etc. All these act like 
taxes on businesses, reducing their expected profitability. The government usually stands at 
the centre of this system of resource diversion, either as an active player or a passive one 
through the structure of incentives it puts in place (see Easterly, 2001). Economic instability 
is often the result of political instability and vice versa. As Jones (2002: 142) remarks, ￿Wars 
and revolutions in an economy are extreme forms of instability￿.  Instability of the economic 
environment increases uncertainty and discourages investment, thereby affecting growth. 
What role does politics play in Africa￿s economic growth? Information from the 
AERC Growth Project shows clearly how politics overrides economics in policy making in 
most countries.
3 In Burundi for instance, Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2002) show that most of 




more than 100 state firms were created and put in the hands of political appointees close or 
members of the political elite. Most of these firms have never been profitable. Instead, they 
are bailed out each year using taxpayers￿ money. Investment in human capital through the 
allocation of education and health infrastructure has favoured Bujumbura, the capital city, 
and the South of the country, the cradle of the political elite. Rent sharing rather than 
economic and social efficiency of these projects seems to have been the overarching 
objective of the investments. 
Burundi is not an exception in Africa. The similarity of political problems 
confronting many countries in Africa is striking. In many countries the similarities regarding 
regionalization of politics and economic policymaking is surprising. There is often tension 
between those favoured, namely those directly or indirectly identifying with the political 
leadership, and those at the other end of the spectrum. This distinction may take an ethnic, 
regional or even religious form. When violence erupts, economic infrastructure is usually the 
target of those opposing the leadership as they perceive infrastructure as a symbol of their 
exploitation. In Sudan where a predominantly Arab and Muslim North has been fighting a 
long war with a predominantly Christian and Animist South, oil installations in the South are 
often sabotaged by the Southern rebels who do not gain benefits from oil exports.  
In Nigeria populations from the Southern Delta region that produces most of the 
country￿s oil have engaged in acts of sabotage to disrupt the flow of oil from their region. 
The current war in Cote d￿Ivoire is often referred to as a political war between the 
predominantly Muslim North and the Christian South for equality of political rights. The 
rebels have targeted cocoa producing regions, which has already resulted in an increased 
pressure on cocoa prices in the international market. In the Central African Republic (CAR), 
                                                                                                                                                 




the regional political divide is similar to that in Burundi. The recent coup d￿Øtat in CAR was 
a replica of the 1993 coup in Burundi (see Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). As in Burundi, 
the country￿s political elite and the army have been traditionally dominated by people from 
the South. The North-South political divide is also observed in Chad and Togo, among 
others. One way or the other, most of the 30-country studies in the AERC Growth Project 
have argued for a close negative relationship between political instability and economic 
performance.  
 
4. The System Generalised Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) and Growth Equations 
A number of influential studies in the empirical growth literature have estimated growth 
equations using cross-section averages over twenty to thirty years.
4 Although there may be 
some theoretical support for using cross-sectional averages in panel data analysis, especially 
when one is interested in an ￿average￿ slope coefficient, the most interesting cases of growth 
analysis show that a cross-sectional model has a number of shortcomings. First, averaging 
data over such long periods wastes valuable information on the dynamics of the 
phenomenon under analysis. This is particularly the case with the analysis of growth, which 
is dynamic by definition. Secondly, estimates from a cross-section equation will more likely 
suffer from an omitted variable bias due to heterogeneity. Thirdly, some variables explaining 
growth, especially the investment variable, will more likely be endogenous so they need to be 
instrumented for. It should be noted, though, that the problem of endogeneity is not 
particular to dynamic panel models. 
                                                                                                                                                 
restraint￿ (Collier, 1991).  




Step by step, we show why the SYS-GMM is our preferred estimation approach.
5 
The SYS-GMM method addresses the problems of omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and 
unit root effects in the choice of instruments (see Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
 
We start with a cross-section model of the form: 
 
ii i i gy x α βγε =+ + +                                                 (1) 
 
where theisubscripts refer to country, with  1,2,... iN = . Variable i g is country 
th i average of 
real per capita (or per worker) GDP growth rate over the sample period, i y represents initial 
output level while  i x is a vector of other explanatory variables, and  i ε is the error term. 
,  and  α βγ are the parameters to be estimated. If the sample is, say, from 1960 to 1990 with 
half decadal data, there are NT data points available, where 6 T = (in a balanced panel). 
However, equation (1) uses only N data points, referring to the point made earlier regarding 
the waste of information associated with the estimation of a cross-section equation. The 
other disadvantage of equation (1) is that if the vector  i x  contains one or more endogenous 
variables (this is especially the case with the investment variable), the estimates will be biased. 
Lastly, the equation does not take into account the problem of heterogeneity among 
countries, which introduces an omitted variable bias. 
Most but not all of these shortcomings are solved by using a dynamic panel data 
model.
6 Using the time dimension not only increases the data points toNT but it also allows 
                                                 




us to solve the problem of heterogeneity. Assume that instead of the specification (1) our 
model is in the following panel form:  
 
,, 1 , , it it it it gy x α βγ ε − =+ + +                                                        (2) 
 
where thetsubscripts refer to time. If the panel has some time invariant effects, we account 
for them by decomposing the error component in equation (2) into a time invariant and a 
time variant components such that:  
 
,, it i it ε µ ν =+                                                              (3) 
 
where i µ is the time invariant and , it ν the time variant error components. Substituting 
equation (3) into equation (2) we have: 
 
,, 1 , , it it it i it gy x α βγ µ ν − =+ + ++                                              (4) 
 
Equation (4) is equivalent to: 
 
,, 1 , 1 , , it it it it i it yy y x βγ µ ν −− −= ++ +                                                (5) 
 
which can be re-written as: 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 It should be acknowledged that if the slope coefficients differ across countries, dynamic panel data models 







,, 1 , , it it it i it yyx βγ µ ν − =+ + +                                                  (6) 
 
where
* (1 ) ββ =+ . By writing equation (6) in first differences, we have:  
 
*
,, 1 , , it it it it yyx βγ ν − ∆=∆ + ∆+ ∆                                                (7) 
 
given that ,, 1 0 it it µµ − −= . This transformation solves the problem of heterogeneity (omitted 
variable bias) by sweeping  i µ out of equation (6). However, while doing so, the method 
introduces the problem of endogeneity. By inspection, we see that  ,1 it y − is endogenous to the 
error term through ,1 it ν − . The relationship between  ,1 it y − and  ,1 it ν − in equation (7) is the same 
as the relationship between the dependent variable and the error term in equation (6) but 
only lagged once. Hence: 
 
, , ,1 ,1  ()   ( ) it it it it if y f y f ν ν −− = ⇒ =                                           (8) 
 
Therefore, estimating equation (7) by OLS produces biased estimates ofβ . Nickell (1981) 
identifies three characteristics of the bias: (i) it is negative for positive values ofβ ; (ii) it 
increases withβ ; and, (iii) it (slowly) decreases inT . The second characteristic implies that 
regressions using inappropriate estimation methods may wrongly suggest the presence of 




In order to solve the problem of endogeneity, Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose 
the use of an instrumental variable that instruments for  ,1 it y − ∆ in equation (7). Following the 
standard arguments on the use of instrumental variables, Anderson and Hsiao suggest using 
,2 it y − ∆ as a good instrument (but in a latter paper they suggested ,2 it y − ) along with the other 
exogenous variables at the right-hand side of equation (7). Therefore, Anderson and Hsiao￿s 
vector of instrument is  ,2 , [,] it it Z yx − =∆ assuming that all variables in , it x ∆ are exogenous, 
which is not the case as we discuss below. 
Building on Anderson and Hsiao￿s result that  ,2 it y − is a good instrument, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) argue that if that is the case, then  ,3 ,4 , , ..., it it it k yy y −− − are also good 
instruments, leading to the following moment restrictions
7: 
 




,, ( ) 0     1,2,3,....,( 1) it k it Ex f o rk T ν − ∆= = −                               (10) 
 
Equations (9) and (10) show clearly that there are more valid instruments than endogenous 
variables. In order to combine the instruments in an efficient way, Arellano and Bond 
propose the use of Hansen (1982) Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimator. It is 






23 1 2 [ , ,..., , , ,...] tt t t t Zy y x xx −− − − =∆ ∆ ∆                                    (11) 
 
Secondly, the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of the instruments denoted H A , is 
computed to combine the instruments efficiently and then used to derive the GMM 
estimator: 
^
’* * ’ 1 ’* * ’ () GMM HH X ZAZX XZAZy δ
− =                                   (12)  
 
The main advantage of the GMM over the Anderson Hsiao instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator is that it is more efficient and consistent (albeit asymptotically) as it uses more 
moment restrictions than the latter. In addition, if any of the variables in  , it x is endogenous, 
appropriate instruments can be easily found using pre-determined and exogenous variables 
within the system. This is typically the case with the investment variable in growth 
regressions. The fact that internal instruments are available to help solve the problem of 
endogenous explanatory variables makes GMM an appealing estimation method. 
The
^
GMM δ estimator in (12) is called ￿differenced GMM￿ estimator as it is based on 
the differenced equation in (7). However, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that lagged levels 
of the variables in the system may not be good instruments of current differences if the 
series is close to a random walk. Instead, they propose a GMM estimator derived from the 
estimation of a simultaneous system of two equations, the first being the differenced 
equation in (7) and the second being the levels equation in (6). Suitably lagged levels of 
, it y and  , it x are used as instruments in the differenced equation while  ,1 it y − ∆ and it x ∆ , 
                                                                                                                                                 




provided  it x is strictly exogenous, are used as instruments in the levels equation. The validity 
of these instruments is established using a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). A Difference Sargan test allows to compare first-differenced and 
system GMM estimators. The gain in efficiency from the system GMM is remarkable, as the 
series tend to be random walks.  
To recap, econometric developments in terms of the analysis of panel data over the 
last twenty years and estimation of empirical models of economic growth have demonstrated 
the need for ￿instrumenting￿ for one or more of the explanatory variables. More and more 
studies are using the Generalised Method of Moments given its ability to provide internal 
instruments in an efficient combination. 
 
5. Hoeffler￿s Augmented Solow Empirical Model  
Hoeffler estimates five models which are compared to determine which one explains growth 
best. These are OLS, fixed effects, instrumental variables, difference GMM and system 
GMM. On the basis of the discussion in section 3, we focus on and employ Hoeffler￿s 
(2002) SYS-GMM estimates as our benchmark. Table 1 presents Hoeffler￿s results. 
The results in Table 1 show that the key variables of the Solow model are significant 
with the expected signs. The first variable, ln(GDPt-1) is the log of GDP per capita lagged one 
period to proxy for initial conditions. When it is significant and negative, it indicates 
conditional convergence. Variable ln(investment) is the log of the ratio of investment to GDP. 








Table 1: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Augmented Solow Model (Hoeffler, 2002) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
 Coefficients  Std.  errors  T-statistics 
1 ln( ) t GDP−  
ln( ) investment  
ln( ) ngd ++  













 of  Number countries 
 of observations Number  
1 first-order correl. m =  
2 second-order correl. m =  






The results reported for  1 m and  2 m as well as those for the Sargan test are p-values of the null hypotheses of no 
autocorrelation and appropriate set of instruments, respectively. Computed standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity consistent. The programme used to estimate the model is Arellano and Bond DPD98 for 
GAUSS. 
 
The composite variable ln(n+g+d) is a linear combination of the rate of population 
growth, technological progress and the rate of capital depreciation. As is conventional, it is 
assumed that the rates of technological progress and capital depreciation are constant across 
countries and sum to 0.05. Therefore, ln(n+g+d) is the log of country population growth 
augmented by 0.05. The last variable is ln(schooling). It is the log of the period average of years 
of schooling and provides a proxy for the level of human capital. As in most growth models, 
this variable is not significant, probably because the number of years of schooling is poorly 
measured.  
The second part of the table shows three diagnostic tests of the appropriateness of 




the first-differenced residuals. The statistics reported are p-values giving the probability of 
correctly rejecting the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The third test is a Sargan test of 
identifying restrictions under the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; 1998). As required, the test for first-order autocorrelation rejects the null 
while the test for second-order autocorrelation fails to reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. First-differencing introduces MA(1) serial correlation when the time-varying 
component of the error term in levels is serially uncorrelated (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
1998). Therefore, GMM estimator is consistent only when second-order correlation is not 
significant although first-order correlation need not be zero. With respect to the Sargan test 
of overidentifying restrictions, the high p-value suggests that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the set of instruments is appropriate. Therefore, both 12 , mmand the Sargan 
test support the validity of the GMM estimator of Table 1. 
It should be noted that investment in the model above is taken as endogenous. It is 
instrumented for by using its lagged levels and first differences (see the discussions above).
8 
Hoeffler￿s (2002) main objective is to refute the significance of the ￿Africa dummy￿ in 
growth regressions by arguing that all the studies that have found a significant dummy are 
based on a flawed estimation methodology. To this effect, Hoeffler estimates a simple Solow 
growth model and proceeds in two steps. The first step is the estimation of the SYS-GMM 
estimator discussed above (see Table 1). The second consists in running a regression of the 
residuals from step 1 on the African dummy.
9 If significant, the results would signify that 
there is a systematic component in the residuals not explained by the standard variables of 
                                                 
8 See Arellano and Bond (1991) for details. 
9  Arellano and Bond￿s GMM estimator is computed using DPD98 programme which produces one-step and 
two-step estimators. Monte Carlo simulations have shown that inference based on the one-step estimator is 




the Solow growth model. Hoeffler finds that the Africa dummy is not significant. She 
concludes that the apparent significance of the Africa dummy found in all the studies she 
surveyed is due to inappropriate estimation methods. Africa￿s slow growth is not due to 
some unexplained phenomena but rather to the low levels of investment and high 
population growth. Therefore, attention should be focused on the reasons why investment is 
so low and population growth high instead of concentrating research efforts on a spurious 
Africa dummy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
one-step parameters with the accompanying serial correlation tests, and the second-step Sargan test which is 




6. Growth and Political Institutions in Africa 
Whereas Hoeffler￿s main objective was to show the irrelevance of the debate on the 
significance of the Africa dummy, ours is to explore the importance of politics as a 
determinant of economic growth. Although, as discussed in section 2, some authors have 
estimated growth regressions that include political variables, their results may have been 
affected by the same estimation problems discussed in section 3. Using Hoeffler (2002) as a 
benchmark, we seek to determine if the inclusion of political variables reduces the residuals 
of her model and, if so, to what degree. We seek to improve the explanatory power of her 
estimates by including measures of political instability, regime type, and violence.  To 
facilitate the comparison of our results with Hoeffler￿s ￿a-political￿ growth model, we 
constrain our sample to the one used by Hoeffler. We then compare the performance of the 
alternative models to Hoeffler￿s in terms of the size of the residuals. If the models that take 
into account the impact of politics outperform the benchmark model, their residuals should 
be smaller. 
  We first concentrate on the impact of political stability (regime duration) and regime 
type.  To proxy for stability, we employ the measure time in office, which is defined as the 
number of years an incumbent leader has been in office; the data are from Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. (2002). We draw the measure of regime type from the standard Polity scores 
(see Gurr and Marshal, 2000).  The Polity survey computes for each country and each year 
an index that varies from 0 to 10, with high numbers meaning high autocracy and 
democracy, respectively. As is conventional, we combine the two scores.  To avoid negative 
values (more autocratic regimes would have negative values), we re-scale the index by adding 




  In general, political stability should be conducive to economic growth. However, the 
question that arises is whether political stability in a dictatorship (for example Zaire under 
Mobutu or Togo under Eyadema) and stability under democracy have the same effect.  To 
measure the impact of stability on growth while also exploring its possibly different effect, 




Table 2: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth and Political Institutions 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables  Benchmark Model  Politically Augmented Model 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Constant 
1 ln( ) t GDP−  
ln( ) investment  
ln( ) ngd ++  
ln( ) schooling  
ln(time in office) 
ln(polity) 



























Dummy Period 75 
Dummy Period 80 
Dummy Period 85 

















 of  Number countries 
 of  Number observations  
Wald test of joint signif. 
Wald-jt sig. time dummies 
1 first-order correl. m =  
2 second-order correl. m =  















The results reported for the different tests are p-values of the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and 
appropriate set of instruments, respectively. Computed standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. The 
programme used to estimate the model is Arellano and Bond DPD98 for GAUSS. 
 
The tests for serial correlation, the Sargan test, the Wald tests of joint significance of 
the variables, and the time dummies all suggest that the GMM estimator in Table 2 is 




Note that the introduction of two new variables in the benchmark sample, namely 
time in office and polity, led to the loss of degrees of freedom due to the lack of data on those 
variables.  The number of countries declined from 85 to 78 and the number of observations 
from 404 to 288.
10 The bulk of the lost observations come from the 1960s; hence, the time 
dummy variable starts from the period 1970-75, yielding four dummies instead of six 
The inclusion of new variables and the reduction in the degrees of freedom have 
slightly changed the original coefficients of Hoeffler (2002) model shown in Table 1. The 
change is the greatest for the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (which changes 
from -0.15 to -0.19). As suggested by the size of the coefficients, the impact of political 
variables is weaker than that of economic variables. The coefficients of the original model 
and those of the new variables are all significant. 
The sign and significance of the coefficients imply that democracy and political 
stability are good for economic growth. This result is intuitive and does not call for 
elaboration.  More problematic is the coefficient of the interaction term. The result suggests 
that the impact of tenure on growth varies with the level of democracy.  Long term 
authoritarians appear to be better for growth than democratically elected politicians who 
succeed in prolonging their term of office (see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).     
Perhaps an autocrat, not needing to face electoral challenges or organized 
opposition, need not to pay so high a price in order to retain power as would a democrat. 
Although engaging in redistribution, he may need redistribute less, conferring benefits on a 
narrow political elite, rather than upon a mass electorate. Incumbents who serve long terms 
                                                 
10 GAUSS software used for the estimations is data constraining. For instance, it requires that observations be 
consecutive, implying that it does not run if there are missing observations ￿inside￿ a country unit in the data 




may, therefore, produce more economic damage in democratic than in authoritarian political 
systems.  
Whatever the interpretation, the results suggest that for a given level of democracy, 
there is an optimal period of tenure beyond which the incumbent leader harms economic 
growth. The optimal tenure period is largely influenced by the strength of the direct impact 




Table 3: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth and Violence (mean incidents) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables  Benchmark Model  Model with Violence 
(Average) 
 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Constant 
1 ln( ) t GDP−  
ln( ) investment  
ln( ) ngd ++  
ln( ) schooling  























Dummy Period 70 
Dummy Period 75 
Dummy Period 80 
Dummy Period 85 
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Wald test of joint signif. 
Wald-jt sig. time dummies 
1 first-order correl. m =  
2 second-order correl. m =  















The results reported for the different tests are p-values of the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and 
appropriate set of instruments, respectively. Computed standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. The 
programme used to estimate the model is Arellano and Bond DPD98 for GAUSS. 
 
In Tables 3 and 4, we explore the impact of violence.  The violence variable in Table 




the half-decadal data. These incidents are assassinations, strikes, guerillas, purges, riots, 
revolutions and demonstrations. Since adding up these variables may be considered arbitrary, 
we run a different model where the violence variable is an index constructed using factor 
score analysis.
11 Only the first factor is retained since all the remaining factors possess 
eigenvalues that are less than 1. Based on these values, the index of violence named violence1 
is computed and used in the growth model. The results are in the following equation and in 
Table 4.  
 
1 0.109* sin 0.163* 0.152* 0.083*
0.373* 0.102* 0.333*





                                                 




Table 4: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth and Violence (factor score) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables  Benchmark Model  Model with Violence 
(Factor Score) 
  Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. Error 
Constant 
1 ln( ) t GDP−  
ln( ) investment  
ln( ) ngd ++  
ln( ) schooling  
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 of  Number observations  
Wald test of joint signif. 
Wald-jt sig. time dummies 
1 first-order correl. m =  
2 second-order correl. m =  















The results reported for the different tests are p-values of the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation and 
appropriate set of instruments, respectively. Computed standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent. The 
programme used to estimate the model is Arellano and Bond DPD98 for GAUSS. 
 
The two sets of results closely resemble each other.  The Wald tests of the joint 
significance of the variables as well as the tests for autocorrelation and the Sargan test 
confirm that the GMM estimator estimated in both tables is appropriate. All the coefficients 




negative and significant in both tables, implying that political violence has a negative -albeit 
low- impact on economic growth given the size of the coefficient.  Inclusion of the violence 
variable has also changed the coefficients of the original model.  
Another way of assessing the impact of politics on growth is by comparing the 
residuals of the benchmark models with those that include the political variables.  Given that 
our central concern is with Africa, we report this comparison in Table 5, which includes the 




Table 5: Residuals from the Growth Model with and without Political Variables 
Countries  Political Variables  Violence (average)  Violence (Factor score) 
 Benchmark  Duration 
and 
Democracy









































































































































































Source: Computed based on the coefficients of the models in Tables 2, 3 and 4. These figures are 
averages of all the sample periods for each country. 
 
  The residuals are calculated as the difference between the actual rate of growth and 
the fitted values generated using the coefficients in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The growth variable 
used by Hoeffler (2002) is a half-decadal observation. To transform her measure into an 
annual growth rate, we multiplied it by 100 and divided it by five. Therefore, the fits are also 
rescaled by multiplying them by 20 (see Ndulu and O￿Connell, 2000).  
The columns labeled ￿Benchmark￿ report the results of the estimation of Hoeffler￿s 




model when political variables are added. For instance for Benin, adding a measure of 
political stability and regime type (plus their interaction) reduced the residuals of the Solow 
model from -0.637 to -0.499.
12 The violence model using the mean of the number of violent 
incidents increased the residuals from -0.113 to -0.149; when the variable is measured as a 
factor score, it reduces the residual from -0.113 to 0.107. Negative residuals imply that the 
model over-predicts growth
13 while positive residuals mean that growth is under-predicted. 
Note that adding duration and regime type to the Benchmark model yields smaller 
residuals.  Sixteen out of 21 countries have lower residuals when these variables are added to 
the basic model. In the ￿violence models,￿ however, only twelve out of 22 countries have 
smaller residuals when violence is measured as the average number of incidents; the number 
increases slightly to 13 if violence is measured as a factor score.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The country case studies produced for the AERC￿s General Economic Survey of Africa 
repeatedly emphasize the importance of politics for the performance of Africa￿s economies.  
The purpose of this paper has been to measure the magnitude and to assess the significance 
of that impact. 
  Employing Hoeffler￿s (2002) system-GMM estimates of an augmented Solow model, 
we have found that political stability and regime type significantly affect economic growth; 
for the African sample, their inclusion reduces the variance left unexplained by the Hoeffler 
equation. 
                                                 
12 As we consider individual residuals to be the distance between the regression line and the observation, we are 
interested in absolute values. 




  Less impressive are the results derived from equations including measures of political 
violence. While statistically significant and of the ￿right￿ sign, the coefficients are small in 
size.  And their addition to the Benchmark regression adds to rather than reduces the 
magnitude of the residuals. 
  These results suggest several possible directions for future research.  The most 
obvious is to re-assess the impact of political violence.  The case studies emphasize its 
significance.  But that assessment fails to find confirmation in the cross national regressions.  
One reason for the difference is that the number of instances of violence is relatively small; 
we may therefore wish to adopt techniques better adapted to the study of rare events.   
Another is that expectations of violence may be as important as its actual occurrence, thus 
muting the relationship between objective measures of violence and economic responses to 
it.  Lastly, violence is entered into these equations along with investment.  But it surely 
affects growth rates in Africa through its impact on investment (see, for example, Gyimah-
Brempong and Corley, 2002).  A portion of its impact may therefore be captured by the low 
level of investment in Africa, and so already incorporated in the Benchmark equations.   
Insofar as this is true, the differences in the residuals reported above would surely 
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